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Abstract 
This case discusses the decline of the Italian airline Alitalia. It sheds light on Alitalia’s financial 
problems, caused by its cumbersome relationships with the government and labour unions and a 
continuous lack of strategic positioning following the disruptive entry of new players in the 
Italian aviation industry. The case covers the most recent developments that have led to Alitalia’s 
bankruptcy in 2017 and ends with a case-study situation in which the reader is challenged to find 
a new positioning strategy and partner for Alitalia to ensure a profitable future. 
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Plummeting from the Sky: The Decline of Alitalia 
  Alitalia is like lazarus with a double heart bypass. It’s dead but won’t lie down 
                                                                                    - Andrew Charlton, aviation analyst 
 
In May 2017, Alitalia’s employees refused to agree with a reorganization plan that would cut 
1700 jobs, decrease salaries by eight percent and inject two billion Euro to save the airline in 
need. The proposal was Alitalia’s management last hope to avoid a bankruptcy procedure, which 
was started shortly after the employees’ dismissal. The main shareholders and the Italian 
government had already stated their unwillingness to provide further structural investments. The 
result was the appointment of three commissioners who, supported by a 600 million Euro 
“bridge-credit” from the government, were tasked with finding a way out of the crisis. Starting 
with a public tender, interested parties could express their plans and submit a non-binding bid 
until mid-June 2017, where after negotiations were planned to enter a more advanced stage. If 
these six months did not yield a new owner, Alitalia’s assets would be liquidated. 
 
The bankruptcy procedure provided the commissioners with a new episode in the turbulent 
history of Italy’s national pride. A history that had cost the taxpayer more than 10 billion Euro, 
mostly due to inefficient business models, strong labor unions and a protective government.  New 
entrants on both sides of the spectrum had disrupted the market and had left Alitalia stuck in the 
middle. After years of hardship, a glimmer of hope emerged when Abu Dhabi’s Etihad Airways 
acquired Alitalia and promised to restore profitability within three years by investing in both 
service levels and routes. Three years later Etihad stopped funding, leaving many surprised about 
what had gone wrong and if there even was a future for Alitalia. As the commissioners went 
through the list of bidders two main questions arose: which strategy would Alitalia have to pursue 
to finally succeed in the international skies? And which partner would be the most suitable? Was 
it time Alitalia would convert into a low-cost carrier or was there still an option of continuing as 
a legacy carrier operating all over the globe? Perhaps a hybrid strategy would be successful to 
restore profitability. The commissioners prepared themselves for an extensive analysis.  
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Alitalia: a national symbol  
Alitalia has a long and rich history that started just after the Second World War on September 
16th, 1946, when it was founded in Rome by the Italian government and the British airline BEA, 
later rebranded as British Airways. Aerolinee Italiane Internazionale was the result of a joint 
investment operation of around one million British pounds with shared ownership. The first 
operations started in 1947 when a full passenger plane flew from Turin to Rome Ciampino. 
During the first couple of years the main routes were the ones between Milan and Rome and 
Turin and Rome. However, Alitalia also operated its first international flight in 1947, when a 
Savioia Marchetti SM95 successfully landed at Oslo airport with 30 passengers on board 
(Historic Wings, 2012). One year later in 1948, multiple destinations in the Americas and Europe 
were added to Alitalia’s routes. Due to these impactful developments, Alitalia soon became 
Italy’s symbol of optimism in the era after the Second World War. Nevertheless, the company 
ran losses in its first four years and passenger levels were stuck at around 75.000 (Historic Wings, 
2012).  In the fifties, Alitalia pioneered the aviation industry in an attempt to become profitable. 
Its entire post-war fleet was replaced by state of the art airplanes such as the McDonnell Douglas 
DC-3 and DC-4. With four propellers, a bigger fuselage and a pressurized cabin, airplanes began 
to take the shape of airplanes we know today. Moreover, the airline introduced female cabin 
members dressed in designer outfits, and in-flight services such as hot meals. These measures 
resulted in an improved financial performance in the first half of the fifties, which motivated the 
management to renew the fleet again by introducing the DC-6, DC-7 and Convair 340. In 1957 
the company merged with fellow Italian airline Linee Aeree Italiane and continued to use this 
name. An implication was that the fleet grew substantially to 40 planes and routes amounted to 
10 million kilometers (Historic Wings, 2012). Due to the merger, Alitalia became the 12th largest 
airline at the time. However, the airline kept on suffering losses in the end of the fifties. In 1959 
there had not been a single year in its history in which Alitalia had recorded a profit. The sixties 
saw a gradual expansion of Alitalia’s network in North America, South America and Europe. 
For the first time the airline passed the one million passengers a year threshold. This increase in 
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passengers coincided with the introduction of jet-engines, which made many overseas 
destinations less than one day away. Alitalia introduced the McDonnell Douglas DC-8, DC-9 
and the Sud Aviation Caravelle in its fleet. The sixties also marked a change in hub (main airport) 
as operations were moved from Rome Ciampino to the new Rome Fiumicino airport. In 1960, 
Alitalia gained international recognition as the official carrier of the athletes during the Olympic 
Games in Rome. Four years later an official agreement with the pope was signed in which 
Alitalia ensured responsibility for all his flights. That same year, 1964, Alitalia founded daughter 
carrier Aero Transport Italiani (ATI) that focused on connecting the North and South of Italy. In 
this decade Alitalia entered the top three of European aviation and more importantly became 
fully owned by the Italian government as the British shareholder was bought-out. Despite the 
lack of profitability, skies were blue for Alitalia in the seventies and eighties. Alitalia kept its 
leading role in aviation by adding new entertainment features, designer cutlery, contemporary 
cabin art and new outfits for its stewardesses. Substantial investments were made in long-haul 
routes to North America for which the brand-new Boeing 747 jumbo jet and the McDonnell 
Douglas DC-10 were purchased. Because of this, Alitalia was the first airline not to operate any 
propeller planes (Mohanty, 2004). The fleet was further updated by the Boeing 727 and Airbus 
A300 to operate shorter flights more efficiently. In the beginning of the eighties Alitalia founded 
a second daughter airline named Aermiditerranea, that mostly intended to fly domestic routes. 
This contributed to passing the 10 million passenger mark for the first time in history in the mid-
eighties. At the beginning of the nineties, Alitalia transported almost 25 million passengers to 66 
countries around the world (Mohanty, 2004). 
 
Heavy turbulence ahead: stuck in the middle 
Problems in the domestic market started to emerge in the second half of the nineties with the 
entry of the low-cost carriers (LCCs) Ryanair and EasyJet. These airlines were founded in the 
eighties and nineties, following the deregulation of the global, and thus Italian airspace, 
formalized in the “open skies agreement”. Previously regulated by the government, this 
agreement made it relatively easy and cost-efficient to start an airline and operate in multiple 
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countries. The LCCs’ business models revolved around reducing costs to an absolute minimum, 
by letting customers pay for every extra on board, and by minimizing turnaround times to cover 
a maximum number of flights per day. The result was a cost advantage of around 50 to 60 percent 
and thus the possibility to offer much lower fares (Mohanty, 2004). See EXHIBIT 1 and 2 for 
an extensive explanation of aviation terms and the low-cost and legacy carrier business model. 
Alitalia, as a legacy carrier, was still charging premium prices and offered premium services. On 
some routes Alitalia’s prices could exceed Ryanair’s fares by factor ten. Alitalia’s response was 
Alitalia Team, a daughter airline that had to compete in both Italy and the rest of Europe with 
the low-cost rivals. The aircraft and personnel both stemmed from ATI, a former regional 
subsidiary, and Alitalia itself. However, lower wages of the cabin crew and pilots and more 
flexible working hours had to reduce costs. The plan was to gradually absorb the parent 
company’s assets and personnel to create a leaner structure, by moving operations to Alitalia 
Team. This last factor led to tension among the work force and another subsidiary was launched 
in 1997 under the name Alitalia Express, operating a much smaller fleet suitable for regional 
flights (Mohanty, 2004). Alitalia soon found itself stuck in the middle, see EXHIBIT 3. On 
intercontinental flights, it lost customers to the likes of KLM, Air France, British Airways and 
Lufthansa, airlines that offered a higher service level and better routes (Mohanty, 2004). In the 
domestic and European market, Italy’s pride lost market share to the low-cost entrants. The fares 
and cost structure could simply not match those of the rivals, as many employees had old 
contracts with the parent company. At the turn of the millennium, Alitalia was bleeding money 
as losses amounted to €170 million in 2000 (Mohanty, 2004). The situation deteriorated even 
further due to the improvement of Italy’s high-speed train connection, which hurt the domestic 
market substantially. Even worse, the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the Iraq war and concerns about 
the SARS disease, resulted in a decline in passengers of about 25 percent in the months following 
9/11 compared to the year before. Passenger levels on flights to the United States and Canada 
were almost halved following the turmoil. In the Italian market Alitalia was losing its dominant 
position as its market share declined from 75 percent in 1996 to 50 percent at the beginning of 
	   7	  
2003 (Mohanty, 2004). The government still had a majority stake in the airline that carried 25 
million passengers a year. The beginning of the millennium also marked a new strategic 
partnership as Alitalia joined the SkyTeam, an alliance between carriers like Air France, KLM 
and Delta Air Lines founded to increase their route offer by code sharing their destinations. Other 
motives were the participants’ increase in leverage when negotiating deals with suppliers of fuel, 
insurances, ground operations and airport slots. 
 
Mayday-Mayday: government, please help! 
Alitalia soon found itself in a situation of overcapacity. To respond to the drastic decline in 
demand, Alitalia decreased its capacity by 20 to 30 percent, mainly by cancelling intercontinental 
routes. To solve the excessive labour force problem, management came up with a two-year plan 
in 2001 that proposed to lay off 4000 employees, decrease working hours and wages accordingly 
(so-called solidarity contracts), cut more routes and decrease quality of services on board 
(Mohanty, 2004). Labor unions strongly opposed to the proposal and demanded the government 
to step in. Their wish was a high-quality restructuring instead of a slimming down operation, 
demanding investments in routes, hubs and service level. The government and labor unions 
agreed on a €1.5 billion injection and favorable fiscal conditions for both company and 
employees. However, management and labour unions disagreed on the employee conditions. 
They finally settled on a soft-measured plan that agreed on an extra €370 million injection from 
the government that would not come at the expense of any job losses (Mohanty, 2004). The new 
plan led to big trouble as the company’s cost structure was highly uncompetitive. High fares, 
high wages and too many employees added to Alitalia’s bills. At the beginning of the decade 
yearly losses were almost a billion, coming close to a bankruptcy. This led to a similar proposal 
by the management in 2003, namely 2700 job cuts and 1500 solidarity contracts for the next two 
years. The response of the labour unions was furious, encouraging strikes and again demanding 
full competitive restructuring instead of downsizing. The position of the government made the 
situation worse by backing the labor unions and demanding routes to and from Italian cities 
remained untouched. President Berlusconi deemed the proposal as unacceptable because of its 
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national importance. Finally, another soft-measured agreement was reached aimed at cutting an 
extremely low amount of jobs and re-energizing the company. The new agreement pushed 
Alitalia even further away from its legacy competitors, also due to the entrance of the high-class 
Gulf carriers: Emirates, Qatar Airways and Etihad Airways. Airlines with unlimited financial 
means, ready to fight for market share on routes from Italy to Asia, the Middle-East and Africa. 
Their strategy was to connect the east and west of the world by building massive hubs in their 
home countries. Also, because of the open skies agreement, they began serving North America 
from Italian bases. Due to their aggressive strategy, they quickly became dominant on the eastern 
international routes from Italy, exorcizing Alitalia on many occasions. Next to that, the LCCs 
were becoming more and more dominant in Italy as their market shares on many routes surpassed 
those of Alitalia. Aviation specialists still blamed Alitalia’s cost structure, pointing at 
overstaffing of pilots and cabin crew and an old and inefficient fleet. Allegedly, the cost structure 
of legacy competitors was about 30 to 40 percent lower, while low-cost competitors had an 
advantage of almost 60 percent (Mohanty, 2004). Alitalia soon found itself running out of cash 
reserves. The government, once again, decided to intervene by providing a €400 million loan 
and by injecting almost €1.5 billion in capital by issuing new bonds in 2005. Direct government 
support was abolished in 2006 by the European Commission. Subsequently, the government tried 
to privatize 49.9 percent of its ownership, but on the condition that no job cuts were made and 
Alitalia’s routes, brand and Italian identity would persist. Air France-KLM agreed to pay almost 
€750 million for Alitalia, raise another billion in capital, invest in routes and networks and 
preserve the Italian identity of the company. The government of Romani Prodi and the board of 
directors agreed on the French-Dutch offer, but the potential deal had agonized multiple labour 
unions and they reacted with several counter offers. Air France-KLM was unwilling to adhere to 
these counter offers and pulled out of the deal. Next to that, incoming president Berlusconi had 
already indicated that he would veto any “arrogant French-Dutch takeover action” and made it 
an important issue in his campaign. Meanwhile, Alitalia resorted to another €300 million 
emergency loan from the government to remain its license for the next year. This loan was 
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investigated by the European Union. Romani Prodi and his successor Silvio Berlusconi made 
another attempt to save Italy’s pride, this time by appointing the Italian bank Intesa Sanpaolo to 
find a new financial structure for the company. The plan that was proposed in August 2008, 
stated that Alitalia should file for bankruptcy and should divide the company into two legal parts. 
The first one would contain the debt plus 46 old aircraft and would be liquidated. The second 
part would contain Alitalia’s main assets such as the landing slots, routes, pilots, top aircraft and 
ground operations. This part would be merged with fellow troubled Italian airline “Air One” and 
would be bought and receive an injection of €1 billion from a consortium of 15 companies, 
among which Intesa itself and state-owned Poste Italiane. Another €625 million in debt was taken 
over by the government. The new company would shed 3200 employees as the result of a 
reorganization by the Compagnia Aerea Italiana (CAI) consortium. Moreover, wages would be 
cut by one fourth and most employees’ salaries would be variable, based on productivity. Alitalia 
filed for bankruptcy at the end of August 2008, entering a new round of negotiation with the 
labour unions. The labour unions were agonized by the proposed measures and rejected the plans, 
however they were not backed by the government this time. Berlusconi’s government stressed 
the symbolic importance of its flag carrier and ruled out the possibility of a foreign airline 
performing Alitalia’s operations in Italy and abroad. After several withdrawals by both CAI and 
the labour unions and multiple improved plans to lay off fewer workers, an agreement was 
reached on September 29th, 2008. In the press statement following the relaunch agreement, 
President Berlusconi expressed his warm feelings: “Due to the brave consortium of 15 
companies, our national airline will be secured for Italy. In this way, tons of tourists will visit 
our country. Our airline will take them to our coastal cities. Not to France, not to the castles 
along the river Loire”.  
 
The new Alitalia: healthy or still lazarus? 
After Air France-KLM had announced to invest a further €325 million to obtain a 25 percent 
stake, Alitalia’s flight operations were resumed on January 13th, 2009. Rome-Fiumicino 
remained a hub, while the Milan-Malpensa hub was replaced by Milan-Linate. Alitalia Express 
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together with Air One CityLiner, was rebranded into Alitalia CityLiner, which received a 
completely new fleet of Embraer 175s and 190s. Even though forecasts were optimistic, the new 
Alitalia went on to record big losses. Passenger levels increased by 11 percent until 2012, the 
load factor increased to almost 75 percent and punctuality also improved, see EXHIBIT 4. 
Operating costs went down until 2012, but then the market turned against Alitalia (CAPA, 2013). 
The European aviation market had suffered tremendously from the global economic crisis and 
subsequent Euro crisis. Next to that, fuel prices reached an all-time record, which had a big 
influence on the costs. Due to Alitalia’s risky position, it paid premiums on fuel prices, aircraft 
leasing and insurance contracts. Alitalia was fighting a battle at multiple fronts: (1) In the 
European and domestic market, LCCs Ryanair and EasyJet had once more responded by cutting 
fares and the domestic high-speed train connections had become an even better alternative to air 
travel. The business market was also affected by improvements in videoconferencing. (2) On 
intercontinental routes, the Gulf carriers offered a very high service level and strong route offer, 
outcompeting the most respected legacy carriers from Europe by a great margin. The European 
legacies were trying to fight back by upgrading their services. This snowball effect was not doing 
Alitalia any good. Even though its cost-base was not uncompetitive compared to other legacy 
carriers, the average sector length (“distance-positioning”) was too low to spread out these 
costs, see EXHIBIT 5. This implied Alitalia was positioned in no-man’s land: neither truly a 
network carrier with a significant long-haul operation, nor truly a short-haul point-to-point 
carrier with a competitive cost base (CAPA, 2013). Hence, Alitalia was suffering from both a 
“value-positioning” problem and a “distance-positioning” problem. Its busiest routes were 
mostly domestic, where competition was fierce from LCCs. The main international routes went 
to other European airports, where travelers connected through hubs of competing airlines to 
international destinations, see EXHIBIT 6. This last point indicated Alitalia’s lack of a 
competitive international route offer and structural underinvestment (CAPA, 2013). Moreover, 
Alitalia’s lack of value-positioning meant it had gotten even further stuck in the middle, see 
EXHIBIT 7. Alitalia’s only move to remain competitive, was to write-off €91 million in planes 
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and replace it with 55 new aircraft, which were predominantly leased (CAPA, 2013). See 
EXHIBIT 8 for Alitalia’s financial performance in the first years after the privatization. Soon 
finding itself in a liquidity crisis, the troubled airline borrowed €150 million from its shareholders 
in the beginning of 2013 and completed a stock emission at the end of 2013 that yielded another 
€300 million. Despite everything, Alitalia was still the largest carrier of Italy and the domestic 
market, but two-third of its revenue came from international flights (CAPA, 2013). With losses 
amounting to a billion Euro in 2012-2013 and a nervous consortium, it was obvious Alitalia 
needed to make a strategic choice regarding its value-positioning and distance-positioning.  
 
Flying high: the Etihad merger 
In 2014, Abu Dhabi’s carrier Etihad Airways decided to invest €560 million in Europe’s 11th 
biggest airline and pay another €400 million to obtain a 49 percent share, which left the majority 
stake with the Italian consortium. Roughly an additional billion Euro in capital and debt 
restructuring had been provided by the consortium and other Italian financial institutions. Etihad 
mainly completed the deal because Alitalia could provide access to the European market, still 
dominated by the European legacy carriers. With this deal, Etihad enlarged its routes by offering 
direct and connecting flights to its existing operations. It was part of a larger expansion plan in 
which Etihad took equity stakes in other airlines to form a large alliance against the existing 
competition. Etihad’s plans with Alitalia were to reposition them as a global premium airline, 
by reinforcing its quintessentially Italian image: the history, culture, food and passion (Etihad, 
2014). The plans were optimistic; 2000 employees were fired to reduce costs. Etihad wanted to 
invest in the hubs Rome-Fiumicino, Milan-Linate and Milan-Malpensa, to increase Alitalia’s 
long-haul offer. Rome-Fiumicino, Alitalia’s most important airport, would see investments in 
new long-haul routes to Santiago, Mexico City, San Francisco, Beijing and Seoul. Frequencies 
to Abu Dhabi were to be increased to feed Etihad’s operations, and more weekly flights to New 
York, Rio and Chicago were scheduled. Furthermore, new short-haul routes would be added. At 
Milan-Linate, flight schedules were optimized to have better connectivity with hubs of partners 
(CAPA, 2014). Moreover, there would be more new routes to Asia and the Gulf from Malpensa, 
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where Alitalia’s presence was very limited. Alitalia would also benefit from increased 
connectivity with Etihad’s other partners in the equity alliance and direct flights from Venice, 
Catania and Bologna to Abu Dhabi were planned. For the first time in history, some domestic 
routes were structurally discontinued. Moreover, some routes to Africa and Asia were 
discontinued, as they could be served from the Abu Dhabi hub by Etihad. To respond to the 
changed route offer, the airline increased its long-haul fleet by a third and transferred part of its 
short-haul fleet (and options) to the Etihad alliance. Further cost savings were to be realized 
through synergies with the equity partners in terms of maintenance, catering, ground operations, 
training, fuel and IT systems (Etihad, 2014). Alitalia’s employees would be trained by Etihad 
regarding etiquettes and languages (Financial Times, 2017). Finally, Etihad aimed at reinforcing 
the Italian brand by improving the catering services and the lounges at airports. When presenting 
the merger in 2014, Etihad CEO James Hogan summarized the business plan and stressed the 
fact that Alitalia had to be profitable in 2017. It was obvious that the airline had to get rid of its 
dependency culture.  
 
Flying low: the Etihad merger  
When addressing the merger at a press conference in early 2016, Etihad CEO James Hogan 
admitted that the reorganization and revitalization of Alitalia proved to be a difficult one, but 
stated that the airline was still “en route” to profitability for the year 2017. One year later, Alitalia 
was again on the verge of bankruptcy after suffering major money losses. The upgrade of 
Alitalia’s long-haul routes to the Middle East, Asia and the Americas, the rationalization of the 
domestic offer, the increased service level, new cost synergies and strong re-branding had not 
worked. The expected increase in passenger levels had never materialized and Ryanair had 
surpassed Alitalia as Italy’s biggest airline. See EXHIBIT  9, 10 and 11 for the development in 
available seats, routes and passengers. While Alitalia even recorded negative growth, Ryanair 
had grown by more than 25 percent between 2014 and 2016 in the Italian market. The load factor 
was only 75 compared to Ryanair’s 95 (Wall Street Journal, 2017). Also, the other Gulf carriers, 
Qatar and Emirates, were exponentially expanding in Italy, making it the second most attractive 
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European market for the them, see EXHIBIT 12. Alitalia’s explanation for the appalling results 
was that the terrorist threat in Europe had a significant influence on the European market. 
However, there were bigger problems. In the years following the merger, only six new 
intercontinental routes had been added, while there was still growth in non-profitable European 
routes (2%), leaving Alitalia badly positioned on distance as it was before the merger (Wall 
Street Journal, 2017). Alitalia was still in a fierce battle as 54% of its flights were domestic, and 
70% of the routes it operated were dominated by LCCs. EXHIBIT 13 painfully reflects Alitalia’s 
overrepresentation in uncompetitive routes, compared to its main rivals. Etihad’s hesitation to 
invest and the strategic impasse created by former agreements with SkyTeam members made 
expansion in North America and the rest of the world very difficult, while competition to the east 
was huge from the other Gulf carriers. Etihad admitted that Alitalia needed a more rigorous 
restructuring since the cost structure was still not competitive. This was partly the result of 
employee expenses and expensive fuel and lease contracts, as a result of Alitalia’s risky situation 
(Wall Street Journal, 2017). Moreover, due to European regulation, Etihad was only allowed to 
have a maximum stake of 49 percent. Managing Alitalia from the Middle East showed that Etihad 
underestimated the country’s tangled politics and chronic labour strife (Reuters, 2017). Etihad’s 
strategy of aligning multiple networks of troubled airlines to feed its Abu Dhabi hub turned out 
to be unsuccessful. In March 2017, Alitalia’s board approved a new four-year plan that would 
have to return the company to profitability in 2019. The CEO stressed the importance of 
Alitalia’s complete network as the short-haul operations are indispensable to feed Alitalia’s 
profitable long-haul operations. Therefore, the former had to become more competitive and the 
latter had to be expanded. The business model for flights of less than four hours would be adjusted 
to the low-cost model, see EXHIBIT 2, meaning that customers have to pay for any extras on 
board such as seat selection, cabin luggage, amenities and food. Next to that, turnaround times 
would be decreased, more seats would be fitted and fares would be cut to match those of rivals 
(Alitalia, 2017). However, preferences could be tailored by the introduction of multiple classes 
in the cabin. The service on long-haul flights would be improved with new entertainment features 
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and interiors. To finally reduce the cost base, Alitalia planned to lay-off 1700 employees and 
decrease the wages of the remaining workforce by eight percent. Furthermore, contracts 
regarding aircraft leasing, fuel, ground operations, catering and airport rights would be 
renegotiated (Alitalia, 2017). The short-haul fleet would be decreased by 20 planes and the long-
haul fleet slightly enlarged to serve new and existing profitable routes to the Americas more 
frequently, made possible by leaving the joint venture with Delta Air Lines and Air France-KLM. 
All the measures combined should increase revenue by 30 percent and decrease costs by €1 
billion in 2019. Shareholders planned to recapitalize the company with €2 billion.  
 
Diverting towards profitability  
At the end of April 2017, roughly 70 percent of Alitalia’s 12.500 employees voted against the 
proposed plans. Etihad’s willingness to inject new capital depended on the result of the vote. 
One week later, Alitalia officially entered a stage of special administration, in which three 
commissioners were appointed to find a way out of the crisis. Their main concern was to ensure 
a feasible future for Alitalia. The government also provided a €600 million bridge-loan to keep 
Alitalia in the air until a new owner was found. The commissioners received the first non-binding 
offers in June and the first binding offers in October 2017. They indicated that they preferred to 
sell Alitalia “as a whole” to avoid parties skimming the more promising parts of the company 
(Financial Times, 2017). The situation proved to be a chance to change Alitalia once and for all, 
because the labour unions were sidelined more than ever. If no new owner was found, Alitalia’s 
assets worth €900 million would be liquidated. The debt amounted to roughly 2 billion Euro. 
The commissioners were puzzled by the different candidates, and the main questions that arose 
were the ones that dealt with the strategy and partner for Italy’s troubled pride.  It was clear that 
a distinction needed to be made between the short and the long-haul operations, for which each 
candidate offered a specific value-positioning strategy. (Low, High) in this case means the low-
cost model for short-haul, and the legacy carrier model for long-haul. Moreover, each interested 
party also comes with a certain focus on distance-positioning. The assumption is made that 
Alitalia will remain a separate brand, owned by a partner airline. 
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(1) The first potential partner, Ryanair, embodies the (low, low) strategy, with the main focus 
on short-haul. The Irish airline had disrupted the market in the nineties with its low-cost model 
and is now the most successful and profitable in Europe, more than double the size of Alitalia. 
As its operations are limited to the European market, Ryanair would be a good network fit since 
Alitalia is still strongly represented in Europe, see EXHIBIT 6 and 13. Flights between Italy 
and important European hubs, now mostly served by legacy carriers would provide the LCC with 
the opportunity to let Alitalia feed the long-haul operations of its strategic partners, a new 
phenomenon in its business model. This would generate high demand for Alitalia’s short-haul. 
Furthermore, Alitalia would benefit from Ryanair’s high market power in Italy, as it is a very 
important market for the LCC, see EXHIBIT 14. Ryanair almost fully rules Milan-Bergamo and 
offers 69 domestic routes, indicating its interest in the Italian market. Furthermore, the 
configuration of the fleet with 95 out of 121 aircraft being short-haul, see EXHIBIT 15, favors 
a scenario in which the partner is specialized in short-haul. The cost base, which has been one of 
Alitalia’s biggest problems, could also be improved because the company could bring in the 
necessary cultural change, for which it has become famous by imposing the low-cost model. 
The question however remains if this is possible, given the history of losses on short-haul routes. 
The necessary transition will probably also dilute the brand of Alitalia, certainly on long-haul, 
as it is still associated with its pioneering role in the past and higher quality compared to LCCs. 
As Alitalia is only sold “as a whole”, Ryanair also has to deal with the long-haul operations and 
26 aircraft, with which it has no experience. These routes are the most profitable routes, but the 
network will deteriorate as the connections provided by Etihad’s network will disappear. The 
LCC lacks scale when it comes to long-haul and large investments are needed, which could also 
include building up a partner network. Its ability to do so remains questionable, given the current 
semi-premium value proposition of Alitalia’s long-haul offer. The upside is that the LCC can 
feed Alitalia’s long-haul flights with its impressive network, generating more demand.  
(2) The second potential partner is Etihad Airways, the former equity partner (49 percent) of 
Alitalia and this represents the hybrid (low, high) strategy, with the main focus on long-haul. 
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As CEO James Hogan indicated, both short and long-haul operations are indispensable for 
Alitalia and this requires rigorous investments. With the labour unions more or less sidelined, 
Etihad could provide this capital and restructuring with its unique financial position, like no other 
airline. The measures taken in the last years clearly point at the increased importance of high-
service long-haul operations, such as the fleet development, service transformation and route 
offer. The question is whether these upgrades would be good enough to compete with other 
legacy carriers. Alitalia’s cost structure is most suited for long-haul and a strong network is 
critical with regards to this, see EXHIBIT 5. Despite the limited increase in long-haul operations 
until 2017, Etihad could from 2018 onwards dramatically increase the route offer as Alitalia’s 
Joint Venture on the North Atlantic was abandoned. The plans to sober up short-haul as listed 
above, are promising to restore competitive balance in the European and domestic market by 
adopting a low-cost attitude. Also, the knowledge that the Gulf carrier obtained about Alitalia 
speaks its favour, as well as the willingness to keep Alitalia’s legacy alive on long-haul. 
However, there would be several drawbacks to this scenario, as Etihad proved to be unable to 
bring the necessary cultural change in the past. The fact that Etihad can only obtain a 49 percent 
stake, and therefore needs European partners, makes it only harder to end the dependency culture. 
Next to that, trust issues with the workforce are likely to arise as 70 percent of the employees 
recently rejected the Gulf carrier’s plans. The Gulf carrier has its own problems in the equity 
alliance, as daughter airline Air Berlin faces bankruptcy problems and many European legacy 
carriers are coming after the airline supported by high profits following low oil prices.  
(3) The third potential scenario is the (high, high) strategy with a balanced focus, that could be 
implemented with IAG, a consortium under the leadership of British Airways that consists of 
Spanish legacy carrier Iberia, Aer Lingus and LCC Vueling. IAG is one of the three big players 
in the European market. Iberia was saved by the consortium in 2011 and successfully restructured 
to return to profitability three years later. The Iberia case shows a striking resemblance with 
Alitalia, as the main problems are similar: an uncompetitive cost structure due to overstaffing in 
combination with strong labour unions, a deterioration of strategic positioning, uncompetitive 
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routes, a weak network and below average service levels. The IAG group managed to improve 
Iberia’s brand value by improving all the aspects mentioned, both short and long-haul, 
reinforcing its historical differentiated strategy. Hence, the consortium showed to be able to deal 
with labour unions, restructuring operations, routes restoration and repositioning. Due to these 
similarities, IAG is an interesting candidate.  However, since the Spanish market is less 
competitive than the Italian market, would a premium experience work on short-haul? Alitalia 
and Etihad had previously shown that the Italian customer was not convinced by this approach. 
For a legacy positioning on long-haul operations, drastic investments are needed to restore 
profitability, risking substantial amounts of money while still being outperformed. Nevertheless, 
with Iberia, IAG had shown that this was possible. However, there is another option within the 
IAG consortium, which is called the (high, low) strategy with a balanced focus. IAG had 
responded to market disruptions in the long-haul market by launching LCC LEVEL. The business 
model of LEVEL is similar to short-haul LCCs and is mainly a response to LCC Norwegian.com 
that gained market share on touristic transatlantic flights due to extremely low prices. LEVEL 
operates from Barcelona, while Alitalia’s modern en efficient long-haul fleet is well suited to 
perform similar transatlantic operations from an Italian base. The consortium could ensure that 
the base is fed adequately and Alitalia could make use of the strong network. It remains 
questionable whether a differentiated strategy for short-haul and focused low-cost strategy for 
long-haul would do the brand any good. At the same time, the long-haul low-cost carriers are 
disrupting the market fundamentally. In some years’ time, choosing for premium on long-haul 
could seriously backfire, like Alitalia experienced before in the domestic and European market. 
Maybe the time is just right to implement this strategy. 
The commissioners were puzzled by the multiple options that had presented themselves. They 
had to act fast as Alitalia was exhausting the bridge-credit that was provided by the government. 
Therefore, they quickly had to decide on the right partner to ensure a bright and profitable future 
for Alitalia. But which partner can provide a future with blue skies and no turbulence?  
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Teaching Note “Plummeting from the Sky: The Decline of Alitalia” 
Case synopsis 
The case begins by informing the student about Alitalia’s bankruptcy in 2017. It gives the student 
the perspective of the bankruptcy commissioners that are tasked with finding a way out of the 
crisis. The case then goes back in time by describing Alitalia’s national importance, which is 
critical in understanding later decision making. Alitalia’s first financial and positioning problems 
in the late nineties are spelled out, and they are analyzed with a special focus on the entry of 
LCCs in the domestic and European market. The case continues by describing the vicious 
triangle between Alitalia, the labour unions and the government, which made restructuring 
almost impossible in the first decade of the century. At the same time, the impactful entry of the 
Gulf Carriers in the Italian market is discussed. The case goes on by describing Alitalia’s 
bankruptcy in 2008 and its performance after its relaunch in 2009. The focus is then transferred 
to Alitalia’s merger with Etihad Airways in 2014. Subsequently, Alitalia’s recurring problems 
are analyzed, together with the most recent developments that have led to the special 
administration in which Alitalia is situated. Finally, the case informs the student to consider the 
short and long-haul strategy separately and goes on by outlining the plans of the three main 
bidders in the process: Ryanair, Etihad Airways and International Airline Group (IAG). 
 
Case objectives 
This case can be used in an intermediate level course in strategic management in both Bachelor 
and Master programs, to highlight issues faced when it comes to strategic positioning of large 
international enterprises such as airlines. For Nova SBE, this implies the courses “Advanced 
Strategy” and “Corporate Strategy” in the MSc program. The case also aims to equip students 
with the fundamental knowledge to understand the forces that are at stake in the aviation 
industry. As the industry is expected to double in size in the next 20 years, it becomes at some 
point inevitable to offer students the possibility to follow a course in aviation management. This 
course could be a newly designed course at Nova SBE, taking position as an elective in the 
curriculum. Lastly, the case also tries to shed light on the stakeholder view of strategy, in 
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particular how the interference of external parties, such as labour unions and the government, 
can interfere with strategic decision making, which resulted in Alitalia’s dependency culture, 
high costs and lack of strategic leadership. 
 
Supplementary readings 
•   Budd, Lucy, and Stephen Ison. 2014. Low-cost Carriers: Emergence, Expansion and 
Evolution. Abingdon: Taylor Francis Ltd.  
•   Dostaler, Isabelle, and Triant Flouris. 2006. “Stuck in the Middle Revisited: The Case of the 
Airline Industry.” Journal of Aviation/Aerospace, 15 (1): 33-45 
•   Mohanty, Dakshi. 2004. Alitalia: The Airline in Trouble. IBSCDC No. 304-381-1. Cranfield: 
The Case Centre 
•   Shaw, Stephen. 2011. “Airline Business and Marketing Strategies” in Airline Marketing and 
Management, 85-162. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited 
 
Case discussion and analysis 
The questions for class discussion presented below are interlinked and follow a logical sequence.  
Question 1 challenges the student to get a comprehensive overview of the case and is in line with 
the objective to get the student acquainted with the fundamental knowledge of this industry. 
Question 2 and 3 form the problem-solution backbone of the case and are linked to the objective 
to inform the student about problems regarding strategic positioning. Question 4 is optional and 
deals with the stakeholder view of strategy, which widens the scope of question 3.  
 
1. Over the past 20 years, the Italian aviation industry underwent some fundamental 
changes, of which Alitalia was the main victim. Analyze the industry attractiveness of the 
Italian market in the given period, taking these changes into consideration.  
- First of all, the student has to mention the fundamental changes in the Italian aviation industry, 
namely the disruptive entry of LCCs at the low end and the Gulf carriers at the high end of the 
spectrum. To understand the impact of these developments he has to look at the changed market 
shares in the Italian market; the decline of Alitalia and the rise of the LCCs and Gulf-carriers. 
- To gain a holistic understanding, Porter’s five forces framework, see EXHIBIT A, should be 
introduced to shed light on all factors that are at stake. New entrant threat: the deregulation of 
the European, and thus Italian, airspace in the 80s and 90s, made it much easier for new-found 
LCCs to enter the industry. They were often overlooked by many legacy carriers (Alitalia in 
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Italy) and quickly gained market share. Examples in the Italian market are Ryanair and EasyJet. 
A decade later, the Italian market was targeted by the Gulf carriers. The capital-intensive nature 
of the industry formed no problem for them, since they had unprecedented financial means at 
their disposal to target, among others, the Italian market (HIGH). Substitute threat: as 
mentioned in the case, the improvement of Italy’s high-speed train connections became a valid 
alternative for air travel, lowering demand between the main cities on the mainland. Briefly 
mentioned, improvements in telecommunications may have had an influence on the business 
traveler segment, as videoconferencing became a cheap alternative (MEDIUM). Buyer 
bargaining power: this has increased with the entry of LCCs in Italian market. With little 
differentiation power, ticket price and timeliness became the main modes to compete. To respond 
to the increased domestic demand following the entry of the LCCs, legacy airlines had to react 
by cutting their fares at least to some extent on shorter flights. To illustrate the striking difference, 
the student should refer to the massive price gaps between Alitalia and LCCs at the end of the 
millennium. The substantial improvements in service-level offered by the Gulf carriers also 
changed the industry, by setting new industry standards on long-haul flights, which most other 
airlines needed to adopt to satisfy customers (HIGH). Supplier bargaining power: The main 
LCCs operating in the Italian market benefited from discounts they received when ordering a 
large number of planes at once, as mentioned in EXHIBIT 2. Newly formed alliances at the turn 
of the millennium such as Alitalia’s SkyTeam and later Etihad’s equity alliance improved 
airlines’ bargaining position vis-à-vis its suppliers. However, as discussed in the case, many 
airlines, among which Alitalia, still paid too much on their leasing, insurance, operations and 
fuel contracts, indicating significant power on the side of the suppliers (MEDIUM). Industry 
competition: industry competition has increased with the entry of Ryanair, EasyJet and the Gulf 
carriers in the Italian market. The development in market share, see EXHIBIT 9 and 10, proves 
the changed and more competitive Italian aviation landscape. Also, the fact that the relatively 
uncompetitive Alitalia lost most of its market share, despite several instances of government 
support, is a strong indicator of a more competitive and diverse Italian aviation landscape. 
- Overall, the industry attractiveness of the Italian market seemed to have decreased over the 
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given period. Most of this can be attributed to the emergence of new players on the battle field 
that changed the competitive dynamics.  
 
2. Alitalia’s financial problems over the years were partly due to a continuous lack of 
strategic positioning in the industry. What were these positioning problems and what could 
have been done to improve this? 
- First of all, it should be mentioned that Alitalia has historically been positioned as a legacy 
carrier, following a differentiation strategy. To obtain a more conceptual insight, Porter’s 
generic strategies model should be introduced, see EXHIBIT B. Then, referring back to question 
1, the student has to start by addressing the first issues that arose in the end of the nineties with 
the entry of Ryanair and EasyJet, airlines that followed a cost leadership strategy.  On the one 
hand, there was Alitalia’s inability and unwillingness to cut cost. On the other hand, there was 
structural underinvestment in routes and service, which meant that Alitalia was losing track of 
its legacy competitors. (1) Value-wise Alitalia was stuck in the middle, as depicted in EXHIBIT 
3: neither following a cost-leadership strategy nor a differentiation strategy. Alitalia’s main 
mistake in this early stage was to completely underestimate the impact of the LCCs. Despite the 
impasse created by the government and labour unions, a stronger strategic direction, either up or 
down should have been chosen. Then the student has to mention that due to this impasse and 
wrong positioning, Alitalia saw the aviation market fragment even further, see EXHIBIT 7. The 
case discusses that Alitalia was pushed even further into the “stuck in the middle positioning” 
due to the increase in differentiation by the Gulf carriers and the undercutting of LCCs.  
- Next to that, it is absolute pivotal that the student mentions another problem, namely (2) 
Alitalia’s inability to either position themselves either as a short-haul carrier or a true long-haul 
network carrier. It is important that the student notices that the two problems are interlinked, as 
explained by EXHIBIT 5 and 6. In 2012, Alitalia was stuck in no-man’s land and its cost base 
was not competitive for its “distance-positioning”. However, it was competitive for a long-haul 
positioning. Alitalia was lacking long-haul scale and most of its operations were limited to the 
competitive Italian and European market. Etihad, after acquiring Alitalia in 2014 should have 
chosen for a clearer strategy that integrated both positioning problems in a coherent manner. 
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- The situation described in the years following the Etihad merger, highlights the problematic 
interplay perfectly. The student has to mention that Etihad attempted to choose for a (1) 
differentiation strategy (value) on both short and long-haul, and (2) to move-up on “distance- 
positioning” towards long-haul. The measures that were allegedly taken: more long-haul routes, 
fewer short-haul routes, more long-haul planes, better service levels and re-branding had not 
worked to solve any of the two different positioning problems. (1) Travelers were not convinced 
by Alitalia’s new services and passenger numbers even showed a slight decrease, indicating that 
Alitalia was unable to cross the gap to the main legacy competitors. On short-haul routes, LCCs 
remained more popular. Next to that, not enough was done to move up on the (2) “distance- 
positioning”. Alitalia was still overrepresented in the non-profitable home and European market, 
with only a share of 16 percent in intercontinental operations. This was much too low, as 
compared to the main European legacy rivals, see EXHIBIT 13. Although Etihad had a 
constructive plan, many circumstances prevented Alitalia from obtaining a clear positioning. 
 
3. Analyzing Alitalia’s situation in 2017, which strategy does Alitalia need to pursue to 
become profitable? Which partner would be most suitable to implement this strategy? Do 
not forget to make a distinction between short-haul and long-haul as mentioned in the case. 
- This question is the natural follow-up of the previous one. The student has to mention the main 
problems of Alitalia’s strategy/positioning, discussed in the last part of question two. We should 
also note that the current situation is rather static, and dramatic change can only be obtained in 
the medium-long run. The most logical approach is to start formulating the best strategy for both 
short and long-haul, where after the pros and cons of the candidates are listed. EXHIBIT B can 
be used again to clarify the possible positioning opportunities.  
- For the short-haul operations, which we define here as the Italian and European market, it seems 
very unlikely that a differentiation strategy (high) can return Alitalia to profitability. As 
mentioned, on 70 percent of Alitalia’s routes competition is dominated by a LCC, which 
symbolizes the traveler’s unwillingness to pay for a premium experience. With its differentiation 
strategy, Alitalia has been loss-making on these routes in the past and even Etihad, after 3 years 
of experience, concluded that this strategy on short-haul did not work out. Moreover, as Alitalia’s 
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operations are still 85 percent short-haul, the result of following this strategy could again prove 
to be disastrous. Italy’s domestic market is also the most competitive in Europe. The negative 
aspect of following a cost-leadership strategy is that it clashes with Alitalia’s historical legacy 
positioning and potential misalignment with a more premium strategy on long-haul. This can be 
solved by introducing different classes in the cabin on short-haul, as proposed by Etihad.  
– For the long-haul operations, the positioning decision is a bit more ambiguous. As mentioned, 
Alitalia is actually making a profit on most intercontinental routes and the cost-base is already 
competitive, which also indicates that the relative lack of quality is not the main issue. The lack 
of scale is the main problem. The long-haul market is still less affected by low-cost airlines, 
despite the new long-haul low-cost model that is gaining popularity. On long-haul, service levels 
and routes are the main modes of competition. Rationalizing this service by imposing the low-
cost model, see EXHIBIT 2, also on long-haul and offering no connections by flying point-to-
point is likely to deter many travelers. It would also not align with Alitalia’s historical 
positioning. However, the long-haul low-cost model, as indicated, is not to be underestimated. It 
would ensure uniformity in the value proposition. On top of that, making the same mistake as 
Alitalia did in the past in the short-haul market, could seriously backlash. Hence, both types of 
positioning could be defended by the student. 
- Coming to the partner choice, the student should immediately observe that option (3) IAG is 
not likely to suit Alitalia’s optimal strategies discussed above. Despite the experience and 
advantages of IAG, a differentiation strategy on short-haul is not likely to be successful, so the 
success of the (high, high) and (high, low) strategies is questionable. Moreover, a balanced focus 
between short-haul and long-haul is also not likely to solve the “distance-positioning” problem.  
However, the options should still be discussed in class as there are many interesting features to 
these strategies. This leaves us with option (1) Ryanair and (2) Etihad Airways. The student has 
to sum up the pros and cons as explained in the case, after which a class discussion should follow. 
- Ryanair (low, low) and main focus on short-haul, as indicated, would be a very strong fit 
mainly due to its strong position on short-haul flights in the Italian and European market and 
Alitalia’s fleet configuration. The main focus on short-haul also provides a strong direction. 
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Alitalia would very much benefit from Ryanair’s high market power. Next to that, and not to be 
underestimated, Ryanair could end the dependency culture that was greatly responsible for many 
financial issues. Alitalia’s legacy image would suffer from this scenario, but uniformity is 
ensured with the (low, low) strategy. The main friction lies in the long-haul operations. Ryanair 
has zero experience when it comes to this, lacks the network and partners, and its “no-fringe” 
model could end up as a success or a disaster. This choice is defendable, but comes with high 
uncertainty.  
- Etihad Airways (low, high) and main focus on long-haul, would also be a strong fit. It 
understands that a cost-leadership strategy on short-haul is needed and, as mentioned, came up 
with a strong plan to implement this. It would also be the only partner that is willing to increase 
both quantity and quality of the profitable long-haul operations, solving the “distance-
positioning” issue. On top of that, it is more capable than Ryanair on long-haul with a very strong 
network and has great financial means. It also has three years of experience in managing Alitalia. 
However, it proved to be unable to change Alitalia’s positioning before and trust issues with 
employees are likely to arise. Moreover, the maximum stake of 49 percent and the carrier’s own 
problems with the equity alliance are factors that do not speak in its favour. Content-wise Etihad 
would probably be the best option, but the mediocre conditions discussed here could cause 
significant problems.  
 
4. Alitalia’s case highlights the importance of the stakeholder view of strategy. Identify the 
main stakeholders, their salience and potential influence in the commissioners’ choice by 
mapping their position for each option. 
- This question widens the scope of the previous question by introducing the various stakeholders 
in the process. It gives the instructor the possibility to increase the difficulty of the case by 
incorporating the stakeholder view of strategy theory. 
Recommended reading: 
•   Mitchell, Ronald K., Bradley R. Agle and Donna J. Wood. 1997. “Toward a Theory of 
Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts.” 
The Academy of Management Review, 22 (1): 853-886 
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Appendix “Plummeting from the Sky: The Decline of Alitalia” 
 
 
Exhibit 1: Definition of the aviation terms used throughout the case 
 
 
Source: Own work 
 
Code sharing A practice commonly observed in airline alliances. Multiple airlines sell tickets 
for the same flight, which is operated by only one of the partners 
Cost per 
passenger 
One of the most popular measures of operating efficiency in the aviation 
industry. Sometimes the term CASK is used as cost indicator.  CASK = 
operating costs / available seat miles (flight distance * airplane seat capacity)  
Distance-
positioning 
The positioning either as a short-haul carrier or network carrier (short and long-
haul). The average flight length in kilometers can be used to classify airlines 
in this regard 
Ground 
operations 
Is a collective term that includes activities such as catering, passenger services, 
cargo and airplane handling  
Hub Main airport in an airline’s network to transfer passengers to other airports in 
its network. “Connecting through a hub” means that the traveler changes 
airplanes at the hub on the way to his final destination 
Legacy 
carrier 
See EXHIBIT 2 
Load factor A measure of efficiency that quantifies the aircraft utilization. Defined as the 
percentage of seats filled 
Long-haul Generally conceived as flights longer than 4000 kilometers. In the case of 
Alitalia this mainly relates to intercontinental flights with the exception of 
Northern Africa and the near East 
Low-cost 
carrier (LCC) 
See EXHIBIT 2 
Pax Number of passengers 
Point-to-point 
 
The notion of directly flying to a destination, without the need to connect 
through a hub. It is the opposite of the network model and is often used by low-
cost carriers so save costs on luggage handling and schedule optimization 
Short-haul Used in the case to indicate flights shorter than 4000 kilometers. Sometimes 
the term “medium-haul” is used to classify the sub-range of flights between 
1500 kilometers and 4000 kilometers. In Alitalia’s situation, short-haul refers 
to domestic and European flights, including Northern Africa and the near East 
Slot Designated time frame purchased by an airline, which allows for take-off or 
landing at a certain airport  
Turnaround 
time 
The time the aircraft spends on the ground in between two flights. This is 
affected by catering, cleaning, luggage handling, boarding and disembarking 
Value- 
positioning 
The positioning either as a low-cost carrier or a legacy carrier. The inability to 
do so results in a “stuck in the middle” positioning  
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Exhibit 2: The low-cost versus legacy carrier business model  
 
 
Source: “Straight and Level: Practical Airline Economics”. Stephen Holloway. 2008. 
 
 
Low-cost business model 
Ryanair, EasyJet, Vueling 
Legacy carrier business model 
 KLM, Air France, British Airways, Lufthansa 
•   Focus on single flights within Europe, 
without offering connecting flights 
(point-to-point) to reduce operational 
costs and save time 
•   Maximization of daily flights by quick 
turnaround times 
•   Mainly flying to secondary airports to 
reduce landing and take-off fees. Some 
airports might even pay LCCs to land 
and depart since they bring traffic 
•   Second-tier slots schedule 
•   Only one type of aircraft in the entire 
fleet to reduce maintenance costs 
•   Placing large airplane orders to receive 
substantial discounts 
•   Limited leg room to increase passenger 
levels and no adjustable seats to 
minimize defects 
•   No hospitality included, food and drinks 
can be purchased on board together with 
perfumery and lottery tickets 
•   Booking and check-in done online to 
limit commission to travel agencies 
•   Additional fees for luggage check-in 
•   Cabin crew cleans the cabin in between 
flights to limit turnaround times 
•   Limited number of seats for business 
travelers with no special services 
•   Lower salaries and more flexible 
contracts for employees 
•   No compensation for employees’ hotel 
expenses 
•   Cost-oriented: advantage between 40%-
65% vis-a-vis legacy carriers 
•   Focus on both European and 
intercontinental flights, offering 
connections (with partners) to cover 
entire routes 
•   Alliances with other legacy carriers  
•   Slower turnaround times and special 
cleaning teams to increase perceived 
service level 
•   Flying to primary airports during the 
most popular slots 
•   Operating multiple types of aircraft in 
the fleet 
•   Relatively spacious leg room and 
baggage allowance more lenient 
•   Hospitality included and source of 
differentiation 
•   Focus on business travelers i.e. multiple 
classes in the cabin 
•   Loyalty programs and business lounges 
for frequent flyers and business travelers 
•   More overhead costs and more 
bureaucracy in headquarters 
•   Employees’ hotel expenses are often 
covered 
•   Involved in cargo transportation and 
owner of multiple ground operations 
•   Service-oriented 
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Exhibit 3: Perceptual map of the European aviation industry at the turn of the millennium 
 
 
Source: Own work 
 
 
Exhibit 4: Alitalia’s passenger numbers and load factor between 2009 and 2013
 
Source: CAPA – Centre for Aviation, Alitalia. 2015. 
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* This exhibit portrays Alitalia’s average sector length and cost per passenger versus its main 
European competitors. Its cost base is quite competitive vis-à-vis its main legacy competitors, as 
can be seen from its positioning on the map below the plotted cost-line for legacy carriers. 
However, its average sector length is more similar to that of low-cost carriers, who have a much 
lower cost per passenger. This indicates Alitalia’s positioning-problem: it is neither truly a 
network carrier with significant long-haul operations, nor truly a short-haul point-to-point 
carrier with a competitive cost base (CAPA, 2013). 
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FCO = Rome Fiumicino    CDG = Paris Charles de Gaulle 
LIN = Milan Linate     LHR = London Heathrow 
CTA = Catania Airport    TLV = Tel-Aviv Airport 
PMO = Palermo Airport    JFK = John F. Kennedy New York 
VCE = Venice Marco Polo Airport   BCN = Barcelona El-Prat 
GOA = Genoa-Cristoforo Colombo   AMS = Amsterdam Schiphol Airport 
Source: CAPA – Centre for Aviation & Innovata. 2014. 
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Exhibit 7: Perceptual map of the aviation industry in 2012 
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Exhibit 8: Alitalia’s financial performance in the years following its relaunch (2009-2013) 
 
 
Source: CAPA – Centre for Aviation, Alitalia. 2013. 
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Source: CAPA – Centre for Aviation and OAG Schedules Analyser. 2017. 
 
 
Exhibit 11: Passenger levels of Alitalia between 2008 and 2015 
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*Routes from Italy to the Middle-East and Asia were largely dominated by Etihad’s competitors: 
Qatar Airways and Emirates, while the European routes were prone to the LCCs. Expansion in 
North America was very difficult as a result of agreements with Alitalia’s SkyTeam partners. 
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Exhibit 13: Breakdown of available seats per destination in 2013 and 2016 for the main 




*Note Alitalia’s slight change towards long-haul operations. It should be observed that 
Lufthansa has similar “intercontinental” levels, but is around four times bigger than Alitalia. 
 
Source: CAPA – Centre for Aviation and OAG. 2016. 
 
 
Exhibit 14: Weekly capacity at Milanese airports by airline in March 2013 
 
 
Source: CAPA – Centre for Aviation & Innovata. 2013. 
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Exhibit 15: Alitalia’s fleet in 2017, including Alitalia CityLiner 
 
































Aircraft type Number 
in use 
Remarks 
Embraer 175  15 Operated by Alitalia CityLiner to serve low-demand short-
haul routes. Capacity around 85 seats 
Embraer 190 5 Operated by Alitalia CityLiner to serve low-demand short-
haul routes. Capacity around 100 seats 
Airbus A319 22 Short-haul aircraft. Smallest member of Alitalia’s Airbus 
fleet. Capacity around 140 seats 
Airbus A320 41 Short-haul aircraft. Capacity around 175 seats 
Airbus A321 12 Short-haul aircraft. The extended version of the Airbus A320 
with a seat capacity of around 200 
Airbus A330 14 Long-haul aircraft capable of serving intercontinental routes. 
Capacity around 260 seats 
Boeing 777 12 Long-haul aircraft capable of serving intercontinental routes. 
Capacity around 300 seats 
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Appendix Teaching Note “Plummeting from the Sky: The Decline of Alitalia” 
 
 






*Porter’s five forces model is a tool that can help to estimate the attractiveness and thus 
profitability of a certain industry. The tool is used in question 1 to understand the impact of some 
fundamental changes in the Italian aviation industry. The five forces are depicted in the exhibit 
above and are classified in the case as low, medium or high. The stronger (higher) the forces, 
the less attractive the industry becomes. 
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*Porter’s generic strategies framework deals with firms’ strategic choice given their competitive 
scope. This framework is used in question 2 and 3 to obtain a more conceptual understanding. 
Legacy carriers can be seen as following a differentiation strategy, while the cost-leadership 
concept can be linked to low-cost carriers. Some new long-haul low-cost players qualify as 
following a cost-focus strategy, given their limited scope. The inability to position the firm in one 
of the quadrants yields a “stuck in the middle” classification.  
 
Source: “Airline Marketing and Management”. Stephen Shaw. 2011. 
 
 
